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Most everyone would agree that people doing the work of clinical ethics consultation (CEC) should 
be qualified. Relevant stakeholders in situ-
ations where the help of a CEC is requested 
are often at their most vulnerable emotion-
ally, physically, and spiritually. Typically, the 
stakes are high. The last thing we would want 
is for someone without the requisite qualifi-
cations, however well-meaning, to make the 
situation worse, or even simply to fail to help. 
Concerns along these lines are creating 
momentum to professionalize the field of 
CEC. When a field is fully professionalized, 
it self-regulates its membership and educa-
tional institutions in the name of some public 
good, and ensures that formal standards (e.g., 
standards of practice and a code of ethics) 
are upheld by practitioners and taught by 
programs that educate and train those practi-
tioners (i.e., through accreditation, certificates 
and/or diplomas) (Baker, 1997).  Proponents 
argue that “professionalization” is needed 
to ensure quality and accountability of those 
responding to ethical questions, concerns, and 
conflicts in health care settings. 
Toward this effort, a group of health 
care ethicists has begun to identify the 
scope of CEC services and the specialized 
knowledge and skills competencies of 
its practitioners. These services and 
competencies are delineated in the American 
Society for Bioethics and Humanities’ 
Core Competencies for Health Care Ethics 
Consultation (1998). Yet, there is currently 
no credentialing process by which clinical 
ethics (CE) consultants can demonstrate that 
they possess these Core Competencies, nor 
any accreditation process by which to judge 
graduate programs as meeting minimum 
standards for educating and training CE 
consultants. Moreover, there is no code of 
ethics for the field.
One might ask whether professionalizing 
the field of CEC is necessary to improve CEC 
services. One way of answering that question 
is to determine whether those performing CEC 
services are qualified. Fox and colleagues’ 
estimated that 29,000 individuals devote 
more than 314,000 hours to performing ethics 
consultations in U.S. hospitals each year (Fox, 
et al., 2007).  According to survey findings, 
only 5% of these individuals completed a 
fellowship or graduate degree program in 
bioethics. This mirrors findings from a survey 
of Maryland hospital ethics committees, which 
showed that the majority of ethics commit-
tee members had little formal education or 
training in ethics (Hoffmann, et al., 2000). Yet, 
there is currently no evidence that individuals 
who completed a graduate degree or fellow-
ship program in bioethics are competent to 
perform CEC.  What about others? According 
to Fox, et al.’s survey, 41% of CE consultants 
learned how to perform ethics consultation via 
formal, direct supervision by an experienced 
member of an ethics consultation service, and 
45% learned independently, without formal, 
direct supervision. While we can agree that 
those with no education or training in CEC are 
unlikely to possess all the requisite competen-
cies, what evidence do we have that individu-
als trained through an independent learning or 
apprenticeship model are not fully qualified to 
perform CEC? 
Before addressing the question of which 
training model produces the most qualified 
CE consultant, we need to understand the 
nature of CEC.
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Network News
the Maryland health care Ethics committee network co-sponsored the conference, 
“Health Care Ethics Committees and Maryland Law—Time for a Change?” on 
December 3, 2008 (see the article in this issue for a recap of conference highlights). 
Proceedings and discussions generated by the conference are informing efforts to 
explore whether to propose changes to Maryland’s Patient Care Advisory Committee Act 
or Health Care Decisions Act. MHECN is planning to survey risk managers and hospital 
counsel regarding interpretations of medically ineffective determinations to further 
inform these efforts. In June, 2009, MHECN will sponsor a basic ethics education 
conference. Details about this conference will be announced soon. For more information, 
e-mail MHECN@law.umaryland.edu, or phone (410) 706-4457.
the West Virginia network of Ethics committees (WVNEC) is coordinated by 
the Center for Health Ethics and Law of the Robert C. Byrd Health Sciences Center 
of West Virginia University. WVNEC has a new website featuring links to member 
resources (including ethics committee tools, WV advance directive forms and laws, 
and an upcoming calendar of events). Contact Cindy Jamison for more information at 
cjamison@hsc.wvu.edu.
The Maryland Healthcare Ethics Committee Network (MHECN) is a 
membership organization, established by the Law and Health Care Program at the 
University of Maryland School of Law. The purpose of MHECN is to facilitate and 
enhance ethical reflection in all aspects of decision making in health care settings 
by supporting and providing informational and educational resources to ethics 
committees serving health care institutions in the state of Maryland. The Network 
will achieve this goal by:
   • Serving as a resource to ethics committees as they investigate ethical  
     dilemmas within their institution and as they strive to assist their institution 
     to act consistently with its mission statement;
   • Fostering communication and information sharing among Network  
      members;
   • Providing educational programs for ethics committee members, other health- 
     care providers, and members of the general public on ethical issues in health 
     care; and
   • Conducting research to improve the functioning of ethics committees and 
    ultimately the care of patients in Maryland.
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Professionalizing Clinical Ethics Consultation – Are We There Yet?  
Cont. from page 1
WhAt is clinicAl Ethics 
   consUltAtion, And hoW 
   do WE knoW it hElPs?   
Innovations in medicine have expanded 
health care options while increasing the 
complexity of medical decision-making. 
Our fragmented U.S. health care system, 
rising health care costs, and growing 
numbers of under- and uninsured, are just 
some of the contributors to ethics questions, 
concerns, and conflicts, being encountered 
daily in health care settings across the 
country. Health care ethics committees, 
and more specifically, CEC services, have 
evolved as one way of addressing these 
issues. CEC refers to “services provided by 
an individual or a group to help patients, 
families, surrogates, health care providers, 
or other involved parties address uncertainty 
or conflict regarding value-laden concerns 
that emerge in health care” (ASBH, in 
press). Evidence that qualified CEC services 
produce a valued benefit may be extrapo-
lated from the fact that high-volume, 
well-functioning CEC services attract 
repeat requests for these services (Fox, et 
al., 2007). This assumes that individuals at 
health care facilities with a well-function-
ing CEC service learn to recognize ethics 
questions and concerns, and request help 
from the CEC service to help resolve them. 
Under-qualified CE consultants most likely 
fail to demonstrate the full potential of CEC 
because they lack the specialized knowl-
edge or skills to effectively address ethics 
concerns, and to distinguish CEC from 
other types of consultations (e.g., medicine, 
chaplaincy, palliative care, social work). 
WhAt shoUld thE  
   MiniMUM stAndARds BE 
   to dEEM A consUltAnt 
   As qUAlifiEd?
The Core Competencies lists basic 
skills and knowledge competencies that 
everyone involved in a consultation must 
possess, as well as advanced skills and 
knowledge competencies that at least one 
person involved in a consult must possess. 
For example, everyone involved in CEC 
services should have a basic ability to 
analyze the value uncertainty or conflict in 
the case brought to them (e.g., recognize 
different stakeholders’ interpretations of 
promoting the patient’s well-being), but at 
least one individual should have advanced 
skills in this area (e.g., mediation skills to 
resolve a conflict). To advance the goal 
of professionalizing the field of CEC, 
the minimum standards for a CE profes-
sional would be set at the level of an 
advanced practitioner—that is, someone 
who demonstrates all the identified skills 
and knowledge competencies in the Core 
Competencies, and any other recognized 
“standards of practice” for an advanced 
CEC practitioner.*  
This admittedly leaves out other 
individuals performing CEC who only 
possess some of the required competen-
cies. The Core Competencies acknowl-
edges that not all health care facilities will 
have a professional ethicist, and provides 
two alternatives for meeting minimum 
standards: (1) a team CEC approach, in 
which all members of the team possess the 
required basic competencies, and individ-
ual members in combination possess the 
required advanced competencies (but no 
one individual possesses all the basic and 
advanced competencies), or (2) a quali-
fied CE consultant with advanced CEC 
knowledge and skills leads each ethics 
consultation, and others who have at least 
basic competency are also involved. 
Establishing a method to demonstrate 
only basic CEC knowledge and skills 
competencies would not address the issue 
at hand, since the basic competencies are 
necessary but not sufficient to effectively 
perform CEC. Notwithstanding situation 
#1 above in which the necessary advanced 
knowledge and skills are found at the col-
lective level of the team rather than in one 
individual, a move toward professional-
izing CEC is a way to ensure that at least 
one individual responding to a consultation 
request has both basic and advanced CEC 
knowledge and skills. 
AccREditinG oR 
   cREdEntiAlinG?
Methods by which individuals could 
demonstrate meeting necessary expert 
CEC competencies include accrediting 
training programs and credentialing indi-
viduals. Accreditation involves an external 
body ensuring that standards for train-
ing competent CE consultants have been 
met—similar to how the Joint Commis-
sion accredits hospitals—and to how the 
Liaison Committee on Medical Education 
accredits medical schools. Such efforts 
would ensure consistency across graduate 
bioethics programs, which currently vary 
tremendously in their ability to prepare 
qualified CE consultants. One criticism of 
such programs is their lack of a mandatory 
clinical practicum, particularly for indi-
viduals with no prior clinical background. 
Another concern with this approach is that 
individuals who have not met competency 
benchmarks might still graduate from such 
a program and thus be recognized as a 
professional CE consultant despite failing 
to meet minimum standards.
The program accreditation method 
would not address how to recognize those 
currently functioning as expert CE consul-
tants. Given that, according to Fox, et al.’s 
estimate, 95% of individuals currently do-
ing CEC have no formal training, and the 
remaining 5% have received formal train-
ing from a non-accredited program, we can 
Cont. on page 9
the American society for Bioeth-
ics and humanities (AsBh) is a 
professional organization for people 
engaged in clinical and academic 
bioethics and the medical humanities. 
ASBH has formed a new standing 
committee on Clinical Ethics Con-
sultation Affairs, which will work on 
standards for the field and address 
possibilities for credentialing clini-
cal ethics consultants and accredit-
ing graduate training programs. An 
ASBH task force is also updating the 
Core Competencies for Health Care 
Ethics Consultation, a document that 
outlines what skills and knowledge 
competencies one must have to re-
spond to ethics consultation requests 
in health care facilities. Anita Tarzian 
is chairing both the task force and the 
new committee. Learn more about 
ASBH, including the annual confer-
ence that will be held in Washington, 
D.C. in October, by visiting http://
www.asbh.org.
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the Case of Mr. M— 
a stuDY of DiChotoMies
Mr. M had fashioned a reasonable life for himself after surviv-ing an assault in which he was 
stabbed in the neck 10 years ago.  The 
knife had penetrated one side of his cervi-
cal spine and brainstem. He was hemiple-
gic with a hemi-diaphragm paralysis. He 
had various problems with motor func-
tion (uncoordinated muscle movements, 
dizziness or fainting in certain upright 
positions, and difficulty tracking objects 
with his eyes). He had a tracheostomy (an 
opening in the throat used to connect to a 
ventilator), and was initially ventilator de-
pendent, but regained the ability to breathe 
on his own during the day, spending his 
nights on the ventilator. He spent his days 
in a wheelchair and mobilized himself 
independently with his good leg and arm. 
He could feed himself, but required some 
assistance with transfers, bathing, dress-
ing and grooming. He was continent of 
bowel but incontinent of bladder and used 
an external catheter. He suffered muscle 
spasms that were controlled with benzodi-
azepines. Other than an occasional urinary 
tract infection, his medical status was quite 
stable over the years.
Mr. M had expert computer skills. He 
spent much of his days on the Internet. He 
was entrusted with computer repair work 
and computer troubleshooting by the staff 
of the chronic care hospital, where he 
resided for the eight years after his injury.  
He mobilized around the grounds of the 
chronic care hospital. He received visi-
tors from the surrounding neighborhood, 
where he had lived prior to his injury. He 
had befriended some of the staff, who 
brought him treats from local grocers and 
delis. Despite these social strengths, Mr. 
M’s care was very difficult for the staff. 
He often refused his daily care and was 
typically angry and verbally abusive to the 
staff. He smoked heavily each day.  The 
pulmonology staff caring for him felt he 
might be a candidate for a less invasive 
form of nocturnal ventilation, since he 
used a cuffless tracheostomy, receiving 
high volume air flow without significant 
pressure support from the ventilator.  He 
refused to be evaluated for this. Although 
his health care team felt he might eventu-
ally be able to transition back into a less 
restrictive community setting, he refused 
to consider this possibility. He did not 
qualify for Social Security or Medicare 
Disability benefits, because he had not 
paid any taxes on his income for the ten 
years prior to his injury. When encouraged 
to participate in vocational rehabilitation 
and enter the work force again, he scoffed 
at the idea, deriding it as bourgeois and 
beneath him.  
The cost of his daily care as a Medicaid 
recipient who was ventilator dependent 
living within the chronic care hospital was 
approximately $1500 per day. Over the 
course of eight years, the Maryland Med-
icaid program had paid over $4 million 
for his care.  When the State of Maryland 
contracted with a new agency to evalu-
ate level of care designations, the agency 
decided that Mr. M did not qualify for a 
chronic care hospital level of care. Rather, 
the agency determined that his physical 
needs could be met and should be met at a 
nursing facility level of care, which would 
cut his daily Medicaid rate approximately 
in half.  Since the chronic care hospital 
in which he had resided did not offer a 
skilled nursing level of care for ventila-
tor patients within its facility, Mr. M was 
forced to leave his home of eight years. As 
he put it, “I got an eviction notice from the 
state and the hospital.”
I met Mr. M in my role as the medi-
cal director of the skilled nursing facility 
accepting him in transfer from the chronic 
care hospital. I became directly involved 
in his care when he fired all of his physi-
cians. As I listened to his rants, I let him 
know that I would try to help him. He 
saw me as a potential tool to achieve his 
objectives and interacted with me very 
reasonably. He told me his assailant would 
be getting out of prison soon on parole, 
just as he, Mr. M, was being handed a 
life sentence to be confined to the nursing 
home. As I made phone calls on Mr. M’s 
behalf, it was clear he could not return 
to the chronic care hospital. He did not 
need the level of care offered there, and 
the chronic care hospital had determined 
that it was not to their financial benefit to 
offer the skilled nursing level of care he 
required within their walls.  Although he 
never really accepted that he could not go 
back, he amended his request, stating he 
just wanted to get out of that particular 
nursing facility. He was accepted by a sec-
ond facility further away from his home 
community. They made arrangements for 
him to visit.  He seemed genuinely pleased 
with the new alternative, and was trans-
ferred.  
The new locale in short order, however, 
predictably failed to meet his expectations, 
and he once again fell into his angry rants 
and abusive behaviors with staff.  He was 
also verbally and physically abusive to 
“The agency determined that his physical needs could be met 
and should be met at a nursing facility level of care, which 
would cut his daily Medicaid rate approximately in half.  
Since the chronic care hospital in which he had resided did 
not offer a skilled nursing level of care for ventilator patients 
within its facility, Mr. M was forced to leave his home of  
eight years. As he put it, ‘I got an eviction notice from the 
state and the hospital.’”
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his roommate and the roommate’s visi-
tors. He was given a private room. His 
high volume Internet use, which involved 
downloading huge files, disrupted the 
Internet connections for the general users 
and his Internet access was administra-
tively curtailed. He then developed a 
paranoid ideation that I personally had 
conspired to bring him and confine him to 
this place. Social work staff made applica-
tions for him at every other skilled nurs-
ing ventilator program in the state, and 
everyone turned him down for admission. 
He refused to get out of bed. He refused 
to come off the ventilator during the day. 
He refused his daily care and personal 
hygiene. He refused psychiatric consulta-
tion at the facility. He refused any psy-
choactive medication. One day when he 
appeared physically ill and mentally inca-
pable of making his own decisions due to 
depression, I sent him out of the facility on 
an emergency petition for both psychiatric 
and medical evaluation.  After 24 hours in 
the ER, and having refused both medical 
and psychiatric intervention, he returned to 
the nursing facility with the de facto diag-
nosis of  “angry young man.” He told the 
social worker that he wanted to change his 
advance directive to read “do not resus-
citate, do not intubate, do not hospitalize 
and do not give any medical treatments.” 
The psychiatry team was called again and 
the patient angrily dismissed them. He 
refused to engage in discussions regard-
ing his decisions and refused medication. 
He started to ask his pulmonologist about 
terminal “one way” weaning. She felt he 
was capable of making his own decisions.  
He refused to discuss his request with 
other staff members.  A hospice medical 
director performed an ethics consultation 
and agreed with the pulmonologist that 
the patient was capable of making his own 
decisions. The patient was offered transfer 
to a local inpatient hospice for his terminal 
weaning, but declined. He actually said 
that he wanted to stay at the nursing facil-
ity and said, “It’s not such a bad place.” 
He wanted the option for terminal wean-
ing, but wasn’t ready to exercise it.
Several months later, the patient sud-
denly decided to get out of bed and come 
off the ventilator one day. He was much 
weaker than before, having been self-
confined to bed and ventilator for many 
months. He went out for a smoke. He 
called in a friend from his old neighbor-
hood. He summoned me to discuss the 
medical technicalities of one-way wean-
ing.  He had chosen the date. He was 
engaging and upbeat. He had made his 
decision. He told the staff to leave him off 
the ventilator that night. They told him 
they would be glad to place him back on 
the ventilator at any time, if he wished. 
Meds were ordered for his comfort, as 
needed.  Morphine relieved his sense of 
dyspnea, but he spent the night wide-
awake, fearing that if he went to sleep, he 
would forget to breathe. He asked me for a 
sleeping pill for the next night off the vent. 
We discussed that the morphine and the 
sleeping pill together would likely depress 
his respirations and cause his breathing 
to cease. He said that was exactly what 
he desired. That evening, he refused the 
ventilator for the second night. He took his 
morphine and sleeping pill and died in his 
sleep.
I have served as medical director and 
attending physician for both chronic 
care hospital and skilled nursing facility 
ventilator programs over the past 20 years.  
I have participated in dozens of terminal 
weaning situations. I firmly believe in the 
right of people to refuse unwanted medical 
interventions, even if such refusal hastens 
death.  Usually in medicine, we do not 
allow suicidally depressed patients to end 
their lives. We try to treat suicidal depres-
sion, even if it means involuntary commit-
ment for inpatient psychiatric treatment. 
However, in Maryland, we do not have 
any programs or facilities that can treat the 
psychiatric needs of suicidally depressed 
patients who also need chronic mechanical 
ventilation. His was a death by dichotomy 
—the dichotomy of chronic care hospital 
versus skilled nursing levels of care and 
funding; the dichotomy of medical versus 
psychiatric health care programs; the 
dichotomy of an autonomous personality 
disordered individual versus a suicid-
ally depressed patient; the dichotomy of 
prescribing to relieve symptoms versus 
prescribing to end a life.  
Some patients are untreatable within the 
confines of our current health care system. 
Mr. M was one of the few “untreatables” 
that I have encountered in my medical 
career.  I believe he might have been treat-
able 20 years ago.  That he was untreatable 
in 2008 reflects how the dichotomies have 
changed in the past 20 years.
Rebecca D. Elon, MD, MPH
Associate Professor of Medicine
Johns Hopkins Univ. School of Medicine
Medical Director
Erickson Health of Howard County
UPdAtE: lEGAl Aid sUEs MARylAnd oVER cARE of PAtiEnts
The Maryland Legal Aid Bureau sued the state on March 6 to try to stop it from moving low-income patients on ventilators 
out of chronic care hospitals and into nursing homes. The suit, filed in Baltimore Circuit Court, argues that the state Health 
Department didn't follow legal requirements in 2006 when it altered guidelines for patients' eligibility for government-funded 
hospital care. It maintains that the state is enforcing the rule only to save money in the Medicaid program amid a serious bud-
get crunch. See http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/health/bal-md.ventilator06mar06,0,3039041.story. 
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shoulD MarYlaND ChaNge its  
PatieNt Care aDvisorY CoMMittee aCt?
On December 3, 2008, MHECN co-sponsored the conference, “Health Care Ethics Committees 
and Maryland Law—Time for a Change?” 
Jack Schwartz, JD, Health Care Law and 
Policy Fellow with the Law & Health Care 
Program at the University of Maryland 
School of Law, opened the day with an 
overview of relevant Maryland law. The 
Patient Care Advisory Committee (PCAC) 
Act requires hospitals and nursing homes 
in Maryland to establish an advisory 
committee (i.e., “ethics committee”) to 
give advice in cases involving individuals 
with life-threatening conditions, in order 
to help lay out ethically justifiable options 
for care and treatment. The committee 
may also educate patients and staff regard-
ing health care decision-making, and re-
view and recommend institutional policies 
and guidelines concerning the withholding 
of medical treatment. The ethics commit-
tee (EC) must include at least the follow-
ing: a physician, a nurse, a social worker, 
the CEO or his/her designee, and, in cases 
involving medical care of a child with a 
life-threatening condition, a medical pro-
fessional with expertise in pediatric end-
of-life care. The institution must adopt 
written procedures for handling petitions 
to the EC.  Nursing homes may have their 
own EC or may collaborate with a hospital 
EC or join with other nursing homes to 
establish a committee serving multiple 
facilities. 
The Maryland Health Care Decisions 
Act (HCDA) establishes legal standards 
for end-of-life medical decision-making, 
including the use of advance directives, 
and procedures for identifying a surrogate 
decision-maker if a patient does not 
have the capacity to make his or her 
own medical treatment decisions. If 
surrogates with equal decision making 
priority disagree about a health care 
decision, the attending physician or a 
surrogate must refer the case to the EC. 
The physician does not have to follow the 
EC’s recommendations. However, health 
care providers who take actions based on 
the HCDA, and health care agents and 
surrogates who follow the HCDA, are 
provided immunity from liability or claims 
that their actions were unauthorized. The 
EC may also play a role when practitioners 
believe the decision-maker is not acting 
within medically accepted standards if 
requesting that a life-sustaining procedure 
be withheld or withdrawn. 
Schwartz proposed the following ques-
tions for conference attendees to consider:
•  Should Maryland law say more about 
       the process and outcomes of ECs, 
       or the qualifications of members?  
       If so, what?
•  Is there a problem with the law’s 
      emphasis on an EC giving “advice”? 
      If so, how might the law be changed  
      to address this problem?
Schwartz recognized the challenge in 
achieving a balance between tolerating 
ineffective EC performance via lack of 
standards, and over-regulating ECs with 
too much legislative detail.
Diane Hoffmann, JD, MS, law professor 
and Director of the Law & Health Care 
Program at the University of Maryland 
School of Law, explored the question 
of whether ECs are accomplishing their 
goals. Hoffmann reviewed findings from 
survey data of Maryland hospitals on 
EC functioning. In general, respondents 
indicated a need for more training of EC 
members and a more formal process for 
consultations. Some respondents ques-
tioned the role and value of the EC, and 
called for better role definition.
Hoffmann proposed the following ques-
tions for consideration:
•  Should case consultation be the  
       primary role for ECs? If so, are ECs 
       doing a good job at it? Do they have 
       the appropriate expertise and  
       composition? Are users satisfied? Do 
       they have sufficient independence 
       from the health care institution, and 
       are they seen as not having a conflict 
       of interest?
•  Should the case consultation model be 
       expanded to include organizational 
       ethics? If so, what expertise is needed 
       on ECs to serve that function?
•  Do any of these changes require 
       changes in Maryland law?
Anita Tarzian, PhD, RN, Ethics and Re-
search Consultant and MHECN Program 
Coordinator, gave an overview of current 
standards for clinical ethics consultation 
as identified in the Core Competencies for 
Health Care Ethics Consultation, pub-
lished by the American Society for Bioeth-
ics and Humanities (ASBH, 1998), and 
currently under revision. Tarzian described 
approaches to credential qualified clinical 
ethics consultants and/or accredit pro-
grams that train such consultants, and the 
pros and cons of moves toward profession-
alizing the field of clinical ethics consulta-
tion (see lead article in this issue).
Data reveal that most individuals 
performing ethics consultations lack 
formal education or training, and are 
involved in very few consults annually. 
Tarzian questioned whether this reflects 
a need to: (1) enhance the consistency 
and quality of ethics consultations 
by addressing qualifications of those 
performing consults, and attend to 
procedural standards for implementing 
and evaluating ethics consultation 
requests, or (2) move toward an integrated 
ethics model, in which the EC focuses on 
enhancing institutional staff members’ 
ethical awareness and knowledge and 
address problems proactively, rather than 
focusing on case consultations per se. One 
question she raised is whether Maryland 
law should require health care facilities 
to demonstrate competency of its EC 
members.
A segment of the conference was de-
voted to sharing various EC performance 
improvement models. Ellen Fox, MD, 
Chief Officer for Ethics in Health Care at 
the National Center for Ethics in Health-
care at the Veterans Health Administra-
tion, provided an overview of the Veterans 
Health Administration’s “IntegratedEth-
ics” program, which has a goal of estab-
lishing a national, standardized, compre-
hensive, systematic, integrated approach to 
ethics in health care. Improving the quality 
of ethics services in VA hospitals is aimed 
at improving employee morale, increasing 
patient satisfaction, reducing legal liabil-
ity, improving efficiency and productiv-
ity, and lowering the use of inappropriate 
medical treatments. 
The IntegratedEthics program includes 
three core functions: 
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•  ethics consultation (responding to  
       ethics questions in health care)
•  preventive ethics (addressing ethics 
       quality gaps on a systems level), and 
•  ethical leadership (fostering an ethical 
       environment and culture). 
Workbooks and resource tools for all these 
domains are available at www.ethics.va.gov/ 
integratedethics.
Evan DeRenzo, PhD, bioethicist with the 
Center for Ethics at Washington Hospital 
Center, described efforts to reduce “non-
dilemmatic consults” at Washington Hos-
pital Center through a “train the trainer” 
educational model, with the “trainer” being 
the hospital clinicians. One of the primary 
methods to achieve this is by weekly 
rounding in different wards or units—that 
is, joining clinical teams for their regular 
work rounds. DeRenzo identified problems 
with the traditional “retrospective” ethics 
consultation, in that conflict often already 
exists, and sometimes polarization sets in 
among involved stakeholders. In contrast, 
proactive measures such as ethics rounding 
heads off conflict before it arises, trains the 
clinicians to handle routine ethics issues 
themselves, and strengthens moral courage 
among health care staff. For example, if 
an attending does not raise an issue that 
a rounding ethicist identifies, the ethicist 
raises the issue, which reduces tension pro-
duced by other staff involved. The round-
ing ethicist can ask a question, such as, 
“Who speaks for this patient?”, producing 
discussion that identifies a previously un-
recognized ethical problem (e.g., the team 
has been talking to the wrong surrogate). 
Over time, the attending physicians learn 
to ask the same questions, which teaches 
them to engage in preventive ethics. This 
results in the EC only getting the truly "dil-
emmatic" cases that require the diversity 
of perspectives from the full committee. 
DeRenzo acknowledged that the rounding 
method is resource intensive, but points 
to research showing that ethics consulta-
tion services pay for themselves via a 
secondary benefit of reduced expenditures 
(e.g., reduced length of ICU stay) with-
out compromising quality of patient care. 
More importantly, the “upstream model” of 
ethics education through rounding elevates 
the moral discourse within the facility and 
within the committee, and invigorates and 
energizes the EC, which can focus on the 
cases for which it is truly needed.
Henry Silverman, MD, MA, Chair 
of the Clinical Ethics Committee at the 
University of Maryland Medical Center, 
presented approaches taken to enhance 
the quality of UMMC’s EC via, among 
other things, on-line educational resources 
for EC members and staff, new employee 
orientation presentations, presence on 
the hospital’s intranet, ward rounds, and 
quality improvement activities (such 
as an ethics consult feedback form). 
The EC at UMMC has taken steps to 
address organizational structures and 
processes that generate particular patterns 
of unethical behavior. For example, a 
committee within the hospital developed 
a Resuscitation Order Form to prevent 
miscommunication regarding the 
meaning of Do-Not-Resuscitate (DNR) 
orders. Also, a hospital-wide survey was 
conducted to identify sources of ethical 
conflict among staff in their everyday 
patient care duties. Findings revealed 
that there were inadequate opportunities 
for staff to discuss ethical dilemmas they 
encountered, and some perceived that 
open inquiry was not supported in the 
institution. In response, the following 
proactive measures were instituted: ward 
rounds, establishment of weekly neonatal 
staff meetings to discuss controversial 
cases, and monthly half-hour discussions 
with internal medicine residents at which 
residents choose a patient for whom they 
think there are ethical issues to discuss. 
Thaddeus Pope, JD, PhD, Associate 
Professor at Widener University Law 
School, proposed the multi-institutional 
health care EC as an alternative to the 
intramural committee. Types of multi-
institutional committees include a network 
(such as MHECN, but one that would 
provide ethics consultation services), an 
extramural committee (e.g., a nursing 
home that uses the services of a hospital’s 
EC), a quasi-appellate committee (e.g., a 
committee comprised of representatives 
from various other health care facility 
ECs who review cases that might present 
a conflict of interest if reviewed by the 
home institution’s EC), and a shared/joint 
committee (e.g., two or more facilities 
that share an extramural, stand-alone EC). 
Pope proposed that these alternatives may 
protect against inherent risks of intramural 
committees, which include making 
recommendations that may be biased, 
careless, arbitrary, or corrupted by conflicts 
of interest or power hierarchies within the 
institution. However, Pope recognized 
the obstacles to these alternatives, which 
include transaction costs, inconvenience, 
and concerns about confidentiality and 
liability. 
In the final conference session, attend-
ees discussed whether current Maryland 
law should stay the same or be revised. 
“Brain-storming” suggestions for revisions 
included: 
•  Mandate trigger-points for an ethics 
       consult, such as a certain number of 
       days in the ICU. 
•  Mandate minimum education for EC 
       members involved in ethics consulta- 
       tions. 
•  Mandate public disclosure of ethics 
       service outcomes or institutional 
       standards.
Others felt that legislative solutions sim-
ply create other problems. They believed 
that ECs should improve their services by 
addressing the problems highlighted in 
the conference sessions, such as properly 
training and educating EC members, 
developing EC procedural standards, and 
increasing awareness of ethics services 
within an institution. 
“Proactive measures such as ethics rounding heads off 
conflict before it arises, trains the clinicians to handle routine 
ethics issues themselves, and strengthens moral courage 
among health care staff.”
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Ethics committees are frequently called upon to determine whether individuals possess the requisite ca-
pacity to consent to, or refuse, a particular 
medical treatment. A committee might be 
asked, for example, to determine whether 
an adult patient with impaired cognitive 
abilities can refuse a life-saving treat-
ment, or whether a child with cancer can 
decline further rounds of chemotherapy. 
In each case, the committee must ascer-
tain whether the patient is competent to 
make critical health care decisions.  What 
standards of competence should guide the 
committee’s analysis? 
The answer to this question emerges at 
the intersection of law, ethics, and philoso-
phy.  Though each discipline has its own 
methods for assessing competence,1  there 
is general interdisciplinary agreement that 
competent individuals have the capacity 
for (1) communication, (2) understanding, 
(3) appreciation, (4) deliberation, and (5) a 
set of values to guide their choice. 
Before describing each of these ele-
ments, it is important to keep in mind 
that competence is “always competence 
for some task—competence to do some-
thing.”2  It is incomplete to say that a 
person is competent or incompetent 
without specifying the nature of the choice 
and the circumstances in which the choice 
is made. A person who is competent to 
make his or her meals may not be compe-
tent to drive a car, just as a person who is 
competent to make health care decisions 
while lucid may not be competent to make 
those same decisions if cognitively im-
paired. Determinations about competence 
should therefore be determinations about 
an individual’s ability to make a certain 
choice, at a particular time, in a concrete 
context.3  
coMMUnicAtion
In assessing competence, the first 
capacity to evaluate is a person’s ability to 
communicate.  Communication involves 
participating in conversations about the 
decision at hand and expressing one’s 
PhilosoPher’s CorNer: 
 DeCisioN-MakiNg CoMPeteNCe
choice. Due either to age or disease pro-
cess, some people with limited linguistic, 
conceptual, or cognitive abilities may not 
meet this basic element of capacity. Failure 
to communicate usually signals a person’s 
inability to satisfy the remaining elements, 
but ability to communicate is not alone 
sufficient to determine decision-making 
competence.
UndERstAndinG
The second factor to consider is whether 
a person understands the facts relevant 
to their decision. Because the process of 
comprehension involves complex sensory, 
perceptual, and cognitive functions, people 
suffering from a wide range of medical 
conditions may have an impaired ability to 
understand treatment information.4 
APPREciAtion
Most philosophers and ethicists agree 
that in addition to understanding the facts 
involved in a particular decision, compe-
tent individuals also appreciate the nature, 
meaning, and significance of their choice. 
This means that they can envision “what it 
would be like and ‘feel’ like to be in pos-
sible future states and to undergo potential 
alternatives.”5  Young children with limited 
life experiences, for example, may not 
sufficiently appreciate the consequences of 
foregoing treatment. Certain psychological 
states, such as depression, also may ham-
per an individual’s insight into the implica-
tions of their decision.
dEliBERAtion
Findings of competence further require 
that individuals possess the capacity to 
reason and deliberate.  Just what consti-
tutes adequate deliberation is the subject 
of ongoing academic discussion, but at 
its most simple, deliberation involves 
engaging in probabilistic reasoning about 
uncertain or future outcomes of one’s deci-
sion. It entails the ability to weigh benefits 
and risks and arrive at a conclusion, aware 
of its possible consequences. One cannot 
engage in deliberation without the capaci-
ties for understanding and appreciation.
VAlUEs
Though some theorists do not require 
this fifth element of competence,6  most 
philosophers contend that to be a compe-
tent decision-maker, one must have a mini-
mally stable and consistent set of values on 
which to base a decision.  These values do 
not need to be fixed or complete; they can 
change over time and evolve to meet new 
circumstances. They should, however, be 
sufficient to allow an individual to evaluate 
his or her decision and its likely outcomes 
against a particular conception of the good. 
When individuals make decisions that are 
not internally consistent with their values, 
further investigation into capacity may be 
warranted. 
Assessing an individual’s decision-
making competence is challenging, and 
it would be an oversimplification of the 
issue to suggest that physicians or ethics 
committees can merely apply the five ele-
ments outlined above to reach a judgment 
in a particular case. Reasonable people 
disagree not only about how to evaluate 
individual capacity within each of the met-
rics, but also about whether the degree of 
competence required should vary based on 
the particular treatment decision at issue.8  
What is clear is that we must take great 
care in rendering determinations in these 
cases so as to strike “a proper balance be-
“Most philosophers and ethicists agree that in addition to 
understanding the facts involved in a particular decision, 
competent individuals also appreciate the nature, meaning, 
and significance of their choice.”
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Professionalizing Clinical Ethics Consultation – Are We There Yet?  
Cont. from page 3
assume that a subset of these individuals 
do possess expert CEC knowledge and 
skills. The question of how to “grandfa-
ther” these individuals must be addressed. 
Such an approach could take the form of 
credentialing them by formally evaluating 
their CEC knowledge and skills com-
petencies. A professional CE consultant 
would thus have to demonstrate all basic 
and advanced competencies, whereas a 
“non-professional CE consultant” (i.e., 
member of a CEC service who needs only 
basic competencies as part of a team ap-
proach) might undergo a different form of 
credentialing or certification. 
Regardless of whether we pursue an 
accreditation or credentialing approach 
to recognize qualified CE consultants, ade-
quate evaluation methods will be needed.  
VAlid & REliABlE
   EVAlUAtion MEthods
Current methods of evaluating the 
competency of CE consultants include 
having members of the CEC service 
self-report the degree to which they meet 
various skills and knowledge competen-
cies. For example, the VA’s tool, which 
was developed using the ASBH’s Core 
Competencies (available at http://www.
ethics.va.gov/ethics/integratedethics/in-
dex.asp), asks the consultant to “Rate your 
ability to educate the participants regard-
ing the ethical dimensions of the case.”  
Possible responses include: “not skilled,” 
“somewhat skilled,” “skilled,” “very 
skilled,” “expert.” While self-perception 
tools provide some information regarding 
an individual’s CEC knowledge and skills, 
they are not robust measures of actual 
skills and knowledge. Having a men-
tor or supervisor who has observed the 
CE consultant rate that individual’s skill 
level using such a tool would be a more 
robust approach. However, producing 
valid and reliable methods at the national 
level by which CEC competencies can 
be effectively evaluated is no small task. 
Knowledge is easier to objectively test 
than are skills, which typically require 
resource-intensive observations. However, 
testing objective knowledge alone (e.g., in 
a board-type exam) would fail to demon-
strate that an individual had the requisite 
skills to practice CEC at the expert level. 
Furthermore, objectively testing expert 
ethics knowledge is difficult, given that 
ethical analyses often produce more than 
one “right answer,” and that legal stan-
dards that inform ethical analyses vary 
from state to state. 
CONCLUSION
Those favoring staffing a CEC service 
with at least one professional CE consul-
tant argue that relying on all-volunteer, 
under-qualified staff to perform CEC as an 
“add-on” to their other work, without com-
pensation or protected professional time, 
contributes to poor CEC outcomes. Such 
individuals may unwittingly cut corners in 
the CEC process, or conduct ethics consults 
based on their own professional bent, with 
little appreciation for how their approach 
falls short. Advocates for professionaliza-
tion argue that the time has come to identify 
expert CEC practitioners, hold them ac-
countable to standards of practice in their 
field, and devote the requisite resources to 
allow CEC services to flourish.** 
Anita J. Tarzian, PhD, RN
Ethics & Research Consultant
MHECN Program Coordinator
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Case PreseNtatioN
One of the regular features of the Newsletter is the presentation of 
a case considered by an ethics com-
mittee and an analysis of the ethical 
issues involved. Readers are both 
encouraged to comment on the case 
or analysis and to submit other cases 
that their ethics committee has dealt 
with. In all cases, identifying infor-
mation about patients and others in 
the case should only be provided with 
the permission of the patient. Unless 
otherwise indicated, our policy is not 
to identify the submitter or institution. 
Cases and comments should be sent 
to MHECN@law.umaryland.edu, or 
MHECN, the Law & Health Care 
Program, University of Maryland 
School of Law, 500 W. Baltimore St., 
Baltimore, MD 21201.
cAsE stUdy fRoM A  
MARylAnd PhARMAcist
Mr. and Mrs. Smith are frequent customers at ABC pharmacy.  Approximately six months ago, 
the couple began fertility treatments be-
cause they were unable to conceive a child 
on their own. Since then, both Mr. and 
Mrs. Smith have been on several medica-
tions prescribed by their fertility doctor 
to help increase their chances of conceiv-
ing. The Smiths insurance does not cover 
fertility treatments and the couple has 
been paying out of pocket for expenses 
related to their treatment. Mr. Smith once 
estimated that they pay approximately 
$10,000 out of pocket per round of treat-
ment. Recently, Mr. Smith took a second 
part-time job so the couple could afford 
another round of treatments.
One day, Mrs. Smith came in to the 
pharmacy with a prescription for birth 
control pills. The pharmacist asked her if 
this meant that she and her husband had 
ceased fertility treatments. Mrs. Smith 
replied that she had secretly been on birth 
control for the duration of their attempt 
to conceive a child, including during 
fertility treatments. She stated that she 
had no intention of having a child but that 
her husband wanted one. She felt that if 
she did not at least try to conceive a child 
McClamrock did not view an appreciable 
increase in risk of harm to the woman from 
taking oral contraceptives concomitantly 
with other IVF medications, because the 
ensuing rise in hormone levels would 
be relatively negligible. However, 
McClamrock pointed out that there are 
appreciable risks of IVF treatment itself 
that should be balanced by anticipated 
benefits.
Regarding the fertility physician’s re-
sponse to the pharmacist, Dr. McClamrock 
pointed out that since IVF clinics publish 
their success rates, it does not make intui-
tive sense that the fertility physician in this 
case would be indifferent to attempts by 
a patient to thwart the success of an IVF 
cycle. Since oral contraceptives are often 
used before the ovarian stimulation phase 
of IVF treatment, it would be important to 
clarify whether the fertility physician un-
derstood that the pharmacist was question-
ing an improper use of oral contraceptives 
during IVF.
REsPonsE fRoM A  
BioEthicist
Faced with two seemingly incompati-ble prescriptions—actually, with two apparently contradictory treatment 
plans—the pharmacist’s first reaction (after 
requesting, and receiving, the woman’s 
explanation) was to contact each of the 
prescribing physicians. Was this a breach 
of confidentiality?
Some readers will likely find this question 
somewhat strange. They will rightly consid-
er that confidentiality is generally required 
(and asserted) with regard to divulging 
personal information to outside agents, and 
is not meant to obstruct sharing of informa-
tion among members of the healthcare team. 
Now I can imagine circumstances where a 
pharmacist might be ethically bound not to 
share certain information with his client’s 
physician; but the case at hand does not 
seem to call for that. Clearly, in contact-
ing the physician who had prescribed birth 
control (BC) pills (“Dr. B”), the pharmacist 
followed the imperative of his professional 
ethics—verifying that the contradictory 
medications are not potentially harmful, or 
may be just futile (more on futility below).
The pharmacist and Dr. B are, with 
respect to the BC prescription, indeed part 
with her husband that he would end their 
marriage. Mrs. Smith tells the pharmacist 
that she had been filling her birth control 
prescription at a different pharmacy and 
asked that the pharmacist not tell her 
husband of her decision to not have a child 
with him.
 Concerned that taking birth control 
while on fertility treatments was harmful to 
the patient, the pharmacist called the OB/
GYN physician who prescribed the birth 
control. This doctor informed the pharma-
cist that he was not aware that the patient 
was undergoing fertility treatments, but 
that he would not change his mind about 
prescribing the birth control pills because 
the treatment was still therapeutic and 
not futile, i.e., it was serving the purpose 
for which it was prescribed, to prevent 
pregnancy. 
 The pharmacist then called the fertility 
doctor and explained the situation. The fer-
tility doctor told the pharmacist to mind his 
own business, and that as long as he (the 
fertility doctor) was being paid, he was fine 
with whatever decisions his patient wanted 
to make about her personal life.
 Feeling that the pharmacist did not 
have a choice, since there was no medi-
cal reason to not dispense the medication, 
he dispensed Mrs. Smith’s birth control 
pills after documenting his conversations 
with her and both physicians. To this date, 
he continues to dispense the wife’s birth 
control pills and the wife’s and husband’s 
fertility medications, even though he feels 
that he is lying to the husband. He wonders 
if what he is doing is ethically justifiable.
MEdicAl fActs
According to Dr. Eugene Katz, Reproductive Endocrinologist at Shady Grove Fertility Center at 
Greater Baltimore Medical Center, while 
research has not been published on the 
concomitant use of oral contraceptives 
during IVF treatment (i.e., during 
ovarian stimulation/retrieval or after 
embryo transfer), it is possible that 
such medication could impair embryo 
implantation in the uterus by affecting the 
woman’s uterine lining (endometrium). 
Dr. Howard McClamrock, Reproductive 
Endocrinologist at University of Maryland 
Medical Center, concurs. Both Katz and 
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of the same healthcare team. But does the 
same logic hold with regard to the physi-
cian providing fertility treatment (“Dr. 
F”)? At first glance the two relationships 
seem fully analogous. With regard to the 
medications taken by the woman for the 
fertility treatment, the pharmacist’s team-
mate is Dr. F; should not the pharmacist 
then address to him any concern about 
the problematic effects of combining this 
with BC pills? Dr. F, for his part, is clearly 
involved in a tripartite doctor-patient 
relationship, since the fertility treatment 
is directed at the husband and wife as a 
couple. This seems to imply that there is 
no problem in sharing the information 
about the BC pills with Dr. F, even though 
he is also the husband's doctor.
This may well be wrong. After all, the 
information that the pharmacist is convey-
ing to the husband-and-wife’s joint fertil-
ity doctor came into his possession in the 
context of a different professional relation-
ship, one in which the patient is exclu-
sively the wife. Was there not a breach 
of confidentiality in sharing her informa-
tion with a physician serving the couple 
jointly? In light of Dr. F’s unexcited reac-
tion, approaching him does not seem to 
have harmed anyone. But there is a lesson 
here: professional duties of confidentiality 
are relationship-dependent.
In any event, calling both physicians 
resolved only one of the pharmacist’s di-
lemmas, namely that pertaining to safety. 
This might leave the pharmacist with 
reservations about facilitating futile treat-
ment (like providing antibiotics for a viral 
infection). But (I rely here on the medical 
experts) it seems that neither treatment 
is entirely futile. The BC might indeed 
prevent implantation, and on the other 
hand the fertility medications taken by 
both wife and husband have a good chance 
of producing a pregnancy. True, pregnancy 
is not (I believe) a plausible nor acceptable 
treatment-goal in itself, so if the woman is 
determined to have an abortion if the BC 
fails, the fertility treatment might, overall, 
be considered futile with relation to its 
proper goal, that is, having a baby. But in 
the case as presented there is no report of 
such determination (that is, that the wife 
would abort any resulting pregnancy); 
moreover, a change of heart over that is 
quite possible.
Is the wife behaving sensibly? In work-
ing on her body at cross purposes, is she 
acting in her own best interests—both in 
terms of her health and in terms of the 
convoluted relationship she is trying to 
sustain? My main response to this is that, 
with respect to the pharmacist’s profes-
sional obligations, it does not really mat-
ter. Having made sure that both prescrip-
tions together are safe and that neither is 
futile, it is not for him to oversee the wom-
an’s values or sensibility. Her autonomy 
means her right to make unwise, even 
self-defeating judgments and choices. As I 
have argued in other contexts, the health-
care system depends on a commitment 
to cooperate despite significant disagree-
ments, at least with regard to assisting 
others in their actions (as distinct from a 
person being asked to act in person against 
his or her principles) (Zohar, 2003).
All this leads, obviously, to the most 
grievous issue: the wife’s misleading of 
her husband, and her expectation that the 
pharmacist continue to take part in what 
amounts to cheating his client. I shall 
address this first in terms of confidential-
ity, and then in terms of direct complicity. 
The pharmacist has learned that the wife is 
misleading her husband, inducing him to 
take hormonal treatment—and to make all 
manner of personal and financial sacri-
fices—while working behind his back to 
reduce the chances for the outcome toward 
which he undergoes all that. The decent 
thing to do, in terms of common moral-
ity, would seem to be to tell the husband. 
If the wife is unwilling to level with her 
husband, is the pharmacist bound by pro-
fessional morality to hold back from doing 
what is right?
In most cases, including those involv-
ing diagnosis of STD (and HIV status), I 
support a strict application of the duty of 
confidentiality, even if breaching it seems 
necessary to avert life-threatening even-
tualities. The main argument for this posi-
tion—contrary to the famous Tarasoff rul-
ing—was made cogently by Ken Kipnis: 
reneging on the promise (explicit or im-
plicit) of confidentiality, or even qualifying 
it up-front, will lead prospective patients 
to refrain either from seeking treatment or 
from disclosing crucial information. This 
will prevent healthcare professionals from 
delivering effective care, and at the same 
time prevent them from attaining the kind 
of information that might help third parties 
at risk (Kipnis, 2006).
I suppose an argument can be made that 
the case at hand is different, since the wife 
could have continued obtaining her BC 
pills at other pharmacies, without letting 
her husband’s pharmacist know of her sub-
terfuge. Even so, the general threat to trust 
in healthcare is still a relevant consider-
ation. We can, however, leave this knotty 
issue aside, because the question here goes 
well beyond that of confidentiality. That 
is, because what the wife is requesting 
of the pharmacist is not merely to keep 
her secret. He is in effect being asked to 
continue what he now knows to be active 
participation in defrauding a client.
Trust is a cornerstone of healthcare, 
but the imperatives of preserving trust 
and of being trustworthy cut both ways 
(Rhoades & Strain, 2000). The pharma-
cist’s duty toward one of his clients cannot 
be leveraged into a requirement, or even  
permission, to cheat another client. Thus 
he cannot continue to fill the husband’s 
prescription in the context of fertility treat-
ment without warning him of his wife’s 
countermeasures. Since there is no easy 
walk-away option, he will most likely 
have to explain his refusal to the husband. 
He might say only “I have learned of a 
problem involving your wife that makes 
Cont. on page 12
“Was there not a breach of confidentiality in sharing her in-
formation with a physician serving the couple jointly? In light 
of Dr. F’s unexcited reaction, approaching him does not seem 
to have harmed anyone. But there is a lesson here: profes-
sional duties of confidentiality are relationship-dependent.”
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it impossible for me to fill this prescrip-
tion.” But this will most probably lead to 
the wife’s secret being revealed.  For this, 
however, she cannot fault the pharmacist, 
as it was she who forced his hand by at-
tempting, in effect, to draw him into her 
scheme as a co-conspirator.
Noam Zohar, PhD
Director, Graduate Program in Bioethics
Department of Philosophy
Bar Ilan University, Israel
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REsPonsE fRoM A  
PhARMAcist-Ethicist
Dr. Zohar provided me an un-earned benefit (a mitzvah perhaps?); I saw a draft of his 
analysis before I wrote this response. He 
has done the philosophical heavy lifting 
for the two of us, which I greatly ap-
preciate. I can focus on certain facts of 
the case that I believe help resolve the 
pharmacist’s angst and illuminate his 
options. My mentor, Albert Jonsen, con-
trasted philosophical ethics with practical 
judgment as differing mostly in perspec-
tive and compared them to viewing a 
road from a balloon versus a bicycle.1  
Valuable perspectives arise even in ap-
plied ethics from the “altitude” at which 
the ethicist views a case, and if Dr. Zohar 
has viewed this case from at or above a 
Case Presentation 
Cont. from page 11
bicycle level, his commentary allows me 
to get down on my hands and knees. 
First then, from an “earthy” view, I 
think it likely that the story told in this 
case is apocryphal. The physicians’ 
responses—and the likelihood that two 
physicians would hold such cavalier 
attitudes—do not ring true, and the case 
omits many details that would be readily 
available in an actual instance. Apoc-
ryphal or not, I do believe that the case 
provides grist for the ethical mill.
Here are case-specific facts about in 
vitro fertilization (IVF) therapy2 that a 
pharmacist should know or very easily 
discover. The husband (DH, or “darling 
husband” as he would be described in 
IVF chat rooms3), is apparently being 
treated for azoospermia. Depending on 
the underlying cause, his medications 
may vary, but all treatments expose him 
to known risks.
As to the wife (DW, in chat room 
parlance) and her drug therapy, fertility 
physicians frequently do prescribe birth 
control pills (BCPs)4  in advance of the 
stimulation phase, partly to synchronize 
the woman’s cycle.  They then give 
gonadotropins5 to stimulate maturation 
of follicles in her ovaries. Eventually, the 
fertility physician retrieves the mature 
follicles (a dozen, on average6), fertilizes 
in vitro the ova contained in them, and 
later transfers the fertilized ova to the 
uterus where, hopefully, they will implant 
and produce a pregnancy. Pregnancy ap-
pears to result in between 20% and 50% 
of IVF cycles. During a normal preg-
nancy, the follicular remains become the 
corpus luteum and produces progesterone 
and estrogen necessary to maintain the 
pregnancy during the first few weeks. 
Retrieval removes the follicle from the 
ovary and no corpus luteum can form, 
so physicians providing IVF typically 
prescribe additional progesterone during 
the first few weeks. Some prescribe ad-
ditional estrogen.
BCPs prevent pregnancy by suppress-
ing endogenous gonadotropin production 
and thus preventing ovulation. However, 
of course, physicians administer exog-
enous gonadotropins in high doses during 
IVF cycles. The resulting successful 
follicular stimulation, oocyte retrieval, 
IVF, and transfer thwarts the mechanism 
of BCP action. Current evidence does 
not support persistent speculation that 
BCPs may interfere with implantation of 
a fertilized ovum.8 The most salient fact 
related to this case is that it is far from 
certain that BCPs taken immediately 
before or after embryo transfer will actu-
ally interfere with the pregnancy. If DW 
persists with IVF therapy, she may very 
well become pregnant.
Another relevant feature of this case 
is the distinct possibility that DW was 
taking birth control pills secretly—at 
least without telling her husband—well 
before they started fertility therapy. Thus, 
she could well be quite fertile, which 
increases the likelihood she will become 
pregnant.
“Pharmacists assume the same commitments to beneficence, 
nonmaleficence, and other prima facie duties as do nurses, 
physicians, or other health care providers. Here, physicians 
are initiators of therapy, with roles as risk assessors who 
evaluate risks, explain them to the patient, and obtain the 
patient’s informed consent. The pharmacist is at the least a 
risk manager who must help minimize the impact of those 
risks and help assure proper use of the prescribed drugs.”
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Pharmacists assume the same commit-
ments to beneficence, nonmaleficence, 
and other prima facie duties as do nurses, 
physicians, or other health care providers. 
The pharmacist’s role does differ some-
what from the physician’s in this case. 
Here, physicians are initiators of therapy, 
with roles as risk assessors who evaluate 
risks, explain them to the patient, and ob-
tain the patient’s informed consent. The 
pharmacist is at the least a risk manager 
who must help minimize the impact of 
those risks and help assure proper use of 
the prescribed drugs. He or she must also 
assume a role as patient advocate.9 
I agree that Dr. Zohar’s question about 
confidentiality relating to the physician 
contacts would surprise most pharma-
cists. The formal codes of ethics of 
pharmacy have since 185210 required 
the pharmacist to discuss problems in 
the prescription with the prescriber. The 
contraindicated use of BCPs in pregnancy 
and their possible adverse interaction 
with gonadotropins presents the pharma-
cist with objective information demand-
ing action. The pharmacist also must 
question continuing gonadotropin therapy 
when the patient does not actually desire 
to conceive. The risks of such therapy 
clearly outweigh any desired medical 
benefits. The two prescribers have clear 
interests in these matters. Under these 
circumstances, consulting with the physi-
cians is de rigueur.  
The pharmacist is right to worry about 
participating in a deceptive practice that 
poses both physical and financial risks to 
DH.11 I mostly agree with Dr. Zohar: the 
pharmacist cannot reasonably agree to 
DW’s request for confidentiality concern-
ing her attempts to render her husband’s 
treatment futile, if DW’s conduct is 
actually likely to achieve such an end. A 
duty to maintain DW’s confidentiality, 
like the duty to avoid deception and pos-
sible harm to DH, is a prima facie duty. 
In weighing what to do when prima facie 
duties conflict, I believe a Tarasoff-like 
analysis, based on likely physical harm to 
a third party, remains an appropriate bal-
ancing test for workaday ethics. Howev-
er, the pharmacist can fairly conclude that 
DW’s IVF therapy is as likely to be suc-
cessful as any other IVF therapy, in spite 
of her use of BCPs. Thus, the pharmacist 
can go to sleep at night knowing that, in 
spite of DW’s intentions, DH is not actu-
ally deceived about the likely results of 
his treatment and financial investment.
I do not think the analysis ends here, 
however, owing to the ultimate futility of 
DW’s choices. She is deceiving her hus-
band to keep the marriage together. She 
blames her husband for compelling her to 
undergo expensive, dangerous, and some-
times painful procedures that she does 
not actually want to experience. Has she 
made autonomous informed decisions, 
autonomous misinformed decisions, or is 
she acting under duress? Someone in her 
care team ought to be at least helping her 
face the reality that in the long run her 
marriage is not likely to succeed based on 
her present course of action.
The understanding that marriages and 
families are undermined by deceit and 
mistrust is not arcane to medical practice. 
Here, the pharmacist has the opportunity 
to help DW rethink her options. Unless 
he has clearly explained to DW why her 
strategy of taking BCPs is likely to fail 
on pharmacological grounds, he has not 
done the least that he should.
William E. Fassett, PhD, RPh
Professor of Pharmacy Law & Ethics
Washington State University
Spokane, Washington
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CaleNDar of eveNts
APRil
6 18th Annual lhAs Medical Ethics Update and the 26th Annual Messer lecture: “Reducing obesity: Personal  
 Responsibility or social Policy?” University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine, Scaife Hall, Auditorium 6, 3550  
 Terrace Street, Pittsburgh, PA. Visit http://ccehs.upmc.edu. 
7  (12-1 pm) “do Everything!” truth-telling and trust Building at the End of life. Richard Payne, MD, Duke  
 Divinity  School.  Annual Shallenberger Lecture in Ethics. Johns Hopkins Hospital, 600 N. Wolfe St., Baltimore, MD,  
 Hurd Hall. Contact:  Sharon Mears (410-955-0620, smears@jhmi.edu).
7 (8 am–4 pm) Professionalism: Actualizing Values in clinical Practice and organizational Base. Presented 
 by Patricia O’Donnell, PhD, LICSW from Inova Health System Center for Ethics & Inova Learning Network, Inova 
 Fair Oaks Hospital, Medical Plaza Building, 3700 Joseph Siewick Drive, Auditorium, Fairfax, Virginia. To register 
 call Inova Teleservices at 703-750-8843. For more information contact Patti O’Donnell, PhD, Director, Center for  
 Ethics, Inova Health System at 703-321-2658 or patricia.o’donnell@inova.org. 
13 (4 pm) Why do Patients Volunteer for Risky Research studies? Rethinking informed consent, Again.  
 Speaker: Scott Kim, MD, PhD, Associate Professor, Department of Psychiatry Bioethics Program Center, University 
 of Michigan. 3401 Market St., Room 331,  Philadelphia, PA 19104, Tel: 215-898-7136.  RSVP to clinksca@mail.med. 
 upenn.edu or call the Center for Bioethics at 215-898-7136. For more information visit http://www.bioethics.upenn. 
 edu/colloquium/.
14 (5:45–8:00 pm) talking with Patients About End of life issues: Balancing honesty, compassion and hope.  
 Presented by Inova Fairfax Hospital Ethics Committee, Inova Fairfax Hospital, Cyrus Vesuna Auditorium Physicians 
 Conference Center, Falls Church, VA. To register call 703-750-8800. 
14 (5:30pm- 6:30pm) care of an Unresponsive Patient With A Poor Prognosis. Bioethics Forum Presented by the  
 Ethics Committee of Shady Grove Adventist Hospital: Discussion of New England Journal of Medicine Article:  
 NEJM 360:5:527-531. The NEJM article may be downloaded from the SGAH Ethics Committee website’s Calendar 
 page (www.sgahethics.org/calendar.html). Willow Room, Shady Grove Adventist Hospital, 9901 Medical Center 
 Drive, Rockville, MD 20850, 240-826-6000. For more information, contact Paul S. Van Nice, MD, PhD, MA  
 Chairman, Ethics Committee (paul@vannice.com, 301-509-2225).
22 Palliative care skills for nursing home Personnel, Sponsored by the West Virginia Network of Ethics Committees 
 and West Virginia University. Tamarack Conference Center, Beckley, WV. Visit http://wvnec.org/calendar_of_events 
 for more information, or call 1-877-209-8086.
23 A time to choose, A time to listen. Rabbi Dayle Friedman will speak about end-of-life decision-making at the 
  Jewish Community Center of Northern Virginia. Sponsored by The Hebrew Home of Greater Washington.  
 Visit http://www.hebrew-home.org/site/PageServer, or contact jmichaels@hebrew-home.org, 301-816-7711.
23 (:45 am–12:00 pm) Communication: the Key to Resolving Conflict and Ethical Dilemmas. Harbor Hospital, 
 Baltimore, MD, Baum Auditorium. To register, call 410-350-3506 by April 17. For more information, contact Sally 
 Lewis at 410-350-8218 or Linda Grskovich at 410-350-7794.
24 Palliative care skills for nursing home Personnel, Sponsored by the West Virginia Network of Ethics Committees 
 and West Virginia University. Bridgeport Conference Center, Bridgeport, WV. Visit http://wvnec.org/calendar_of_ 
 events for more information, or call 1-877-209-8086.
27 (12:15 pm) the Berman institute of Bioethics seminar series presents Thomas Pogge, PhD, Professorial Fellow, 
 Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at the Australian National University, Professor of Political Science, 
 Columbia University, Research Director, Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, University of Oslo. 615 N. Wolfe St,  
 Baltimore, MD, Room W4030. For more information contact Erin McDonald at elmcdona@jhsph.edu. 
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29 (4:30 pm) Bioethics in space: thorny Ethical issues at nAsA. Speaker Paul Root Wolpe, Director, Center for  
 Ethics, Emory University; bioethics advisor to NASA. Sponsored by the Bioethics Student Association.  
 UMBC, Catonsville, MD.  Albin O. Kuhn Library, 7th Floor. Visit: http://www.umbc.edu/socsforum/. 
MAy
11 (12:15 pm) the Berman institute of Bioethics seminar series presents Norman Daniels, PhD, Mary B. 
        Saltonstall Professor of Population Ethics and Professor of Ethics and Population Health, Harvard School of 
 Public Health.  615 N. Wolfe St, Baltimore, MD, Room Located at W4030.  For more information contact 
 Erin McDonald at elmcdona@jhsph.edu. 
12 (8 am–4 pm) complex communication issues in clinical Practice: Ethical obligations and legal  
 Regulations. Presented by Patricia O’Donnell, PhD, LICSW from Inova Health System Center for Ethics & 
 Inova Learning Network, Inova Fair Oaks Hospital, Medical Plaza Bldg, 3700 Joseph Siewick Drive,  
 Auditorium, Fairfax, Virginia. To register call Inova Teleservices at 703-750-8843. Contact: Patti O’Donnell, 
 PhD, 703-321-2658 (phone) or patricia.o’donnell@inova.org. 
14 (4 pm) Bioethics colloquium series lecture: The University of Pennsylvania Center for Bioethics  
 presents a lecture by Ruth Macklin, PhD, Professor of Bioethics, Epidemiology and Population Health,  
 Albert Einstein College of Medicine. 3401 Market St., Room 331, Philadelphia, PA 19104, Tel: 215-898- 
 7136. RSVP to clinksca@mail.med.upenn.edu or call the Center for Bioethics at 215-898-7136. For more  
 information visit http://www.bioethics.upenn.edu/colloquium/
15 communication skills for End-of-life care, Sponsored by the West Virginia Network of Ethics  
 Committees. Stonewall Resort, Roanoke, WV. Visit http://wvnec.org/calendar_of_events for more  
 information, or call 1-877-209-8086.
28 (8:30 am) the Growth and development of Pediatric Palliative care. Speaker Brian Carter, MD.  
 Pediatric Palliative Care Grand Rounds at the University of Maryland Medical Center Auditorium, 22 S.  
 Greene St., Baltimore, MD.  Contact: DHARNESS@umm.edu..
JUnE
1-5 Bioethics: Beyond the sound Bite. Intensive Bioethics Course, Georgetown University. Washington, D.C. 
  Contact 202-687-8099, schofies@georgetown.edu.
17-19 harvard Bioethics course. Sponsored by the Division of Medical Ethics, Harvard Medical School (HMS), 
 Boston, MA. http://medethics.med.harvard.edu/education.
JUly
13-16 Ethics from Boardroom to Bedside. Clinical Ethics Summer Institute, Hamilton Health Sciences, Hamilton, 
 Ontario (Canada). Visit http://www.clinicalethics.ca.
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